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The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch
THOMAS H. LEE*

This Article explains what the law of nations meant at the time the
United States was established and how it interacted with the original U.S.
Constitution. The “law of nations” was not only a historical term for modern
customary international law, it (1) was sometimes a broad term for all international law, including conventions or treaties—the “conventional” law of
nations; (2) included principles of domestic law perceived to be shared by all
civilized nations; (3) was a source of the U.S. law of federalism, given the
early American view that the states retained residual sovereignty beyond
what was conferred on the new general government by the Constitution; and
(4) was perceived in part as unwritten natural law. The Americans who
adopted the Constitution were keenly aware of their place in the world as a
militarily weak new state in need of peace and trade with the European
powers for survival, and thus eager to comply with the law of nations—the
intramural rules of the European world order. They recognized that the judicial branch could play an important role in advancing the new nation’s international acceptance and survival by judicious deployment of the law of
nations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, which is why eight of the nine
constitutional grants of judicial power in Article III implicated the law of
nations. The law of nations was the original federal common law.
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INTRODUCTION
Professors Anthony J. Bellia and Bradford R. Clark have written a valuable
book unfolding a new theory of how the law of nations interacts with the U.S.
Constitution.1 The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution questions
the facile presumption that modern customary international law is synonymous
with the traditional law of nations and exposes the fallacy that the law of nations
is a simple construct. Bellia and Clark offer, instead, a tripartite categorization of
its principal fields: the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of state-state
relations.2
Their book reminds us of the importance of engaging history and of understanding the role that the law of nations played in the original U.S. constitutional
order. But, at the end of the day, Bellia and Clark’s historical analysis suffers
from an undue focus on present controversies about whether modern customary
international law—most prominently, human rights law—is federal law, and
about the role of the federal courts in foreign affairs. Bellia and Clark essentially
end up on the “no” side of the “modern customary international law as federal
law” debate, with the exception of what they call the law of state-state relations.
They argue that this traditional law of nations, anchored in respect for the sovereignty of a nation-state within its borders, logically trumps any claim that an act
by the United States or any other nation-state has violated human rights protected
under modern customary international law. The consequence is that federal
courts should dismiss lawsuits alleging such human-rights claims rather than
decide them on the merits. Bellia and Clark assert, as a general matter, that the
original constitutional plan entailed judicial passivity in foreign relations because
the Constitution exclusively grants the political branches all foreign relations
powers.3
My two aims in this Article are to draw a more complete picture of the historical understanding of the law of nations at the Founding and to show how the
Constitution as originally framed envisioned an affirmative role for the judiciary
in U.S. foreign policy. Framing the central inquiry as whether the law of nations
was federal law or state law makes historical findings more portable to modern
contexts, but it is not faithful to the original context. Late eighteenth-century
American lawyers and judges did not perceive sharp distinctions between the
laws of separate sovereigns, having trained and practiced at a time when law was
perceived to be a universal discipline with general principles applicable to all
civilized nations. Bellia and Clark have performed a valuable service by expanding our understanding of the diversity of the law of nations, but the law of nations
1. ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2017).
2. Id. at xiii.
3. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 270 (“by giving the political branches exclusive authority
over the accepted means of pursuing redress against foreign nations, the Constitution authorized the
political branches exclusively to decide whether, when, and how the United States would pursue redress
against foreign nations for their misconduct”).
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was far more nuanced than their tripartite subject-matter characterization presumes. And, in contrast to Bellia and Clark’s tale of judicial passivity in foreign
relations at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, I will tell an originalist story of
constitutionally-authorized judicial activism in foreign affairs.
The written Constitution and its adopters designed the judicial branch to play a
dynamic role in the conduct of the United States’ foreign policy, not merely to
follow the political branches’ lead. And the federal courts in fact played this role
in the first decades of the new Republic. Because the United States was a new and
weak state desirous of commerce and peace with the European powers but fearful
of their intervention in the Americas, the federal courts typically exercised
restraint and were deferential to the sovereignty of foreign states. Ascertaining
and applying the law of nations, most significantly the law of maritime warfare,
was the medium by which the judiciary branch was to play its essential foreign
relations role. The law of nations was the original federal common law. By this I
mean that the law of nations was to be the default source of rules of decision for
federal courts to apply in cases and controversies before them “except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide,” pursuant to parts of all nine grants of judicial power in Article III and its
original implementing legislation—the First Judiciary Act of 1789.4 And this was
regardless of what state legislatures or state courts might have to say about the
cases and controversies in question.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes Bellia and Clark’s
argument. Part II provides a fuller description of the “law of nations” as it was
perceived in the late eighteenth century. Specifically, it sets out four dimensions
of the late eighteenth-century conception of the law of nations missing from
Bellia and Clark’s account. Part III describes Article III’s grants of judicial power
and examines how these grants empowered the federal courts to decide cases
using rules drawn from the law of nations. It also describes how the First
Congress selectively implemented these constitutional grants in the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Part IV asserts that the respect for nation-state sovereignty that
Bellia and Clark attribute to the state-state relations branch of the law of
nations is the manifestation of a deeper political principle—the commitment of
a new, militarily weak revolutionary republic to autonomous self-government
and reciprocal non-intervention by the European great powers. The right of
such a new state to be treated as an equal sovereign and thus to be left alone by
the powerful European monarchies—most importantly Great Britain—was the
foundation stone of the new Republic and its constitutional order with respect to
foreign relations. It is this original geopolitical context—inapplicable to the
United States today as the leading world power—and not the law of state-state
relations—that explains the special regard for sovereign autonomy in the U.S. constitutional order, not the traditional law of state-state relations. In fact, the law of
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(2012)).
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state-state relations has itself evolved over the intervening centuries. It no longer
adheres to the organizing principle that the sovereign state is the only actor on the
international plane, most importantly by recognizing the validity of international
human rights claims against such states. Accordingly, Bellia and Clark’s presumption that the law of state-state relations today is essentially the same as it was in
1787 is misleading. A brief conclusion offers modern takeaways from the historical understanding sketched in this Article.
I. BELLIA AND CLARK ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
The primary insight of The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution
is that the law of nations comprises three different bodies of law: the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of state-state relations.5 The law merchant is
the general commercial law associated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson.6 This body of law included rules about when and how
cross-border commercial contracts were formed and satisfied, such as proofs of
debt and methods of acceptable payment.7 A century later, in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, the Court famously disavowed the law merchant as a source of rules
of decision in citizen-on-citizen diversity suits in federal court.8 The second
branch of the law of nations—the law maritime—encompasses the extinct law of
prize (adjudication of title to ships and cargoes seized in wartime) and the extant
law of admiralty (the law of peacetime transport and casualties on navigable
waters).9 Under the century-old decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,10 federal courts still retain judicial power to decide admiralty and maritime cases

5. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at xiii (defining “the law merchant, the law of state-state
relations, and the law maritime” as “the three traditional branches of the law of nations” at the time of
the Constitution’s adoption).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 29–32.
7. See, e.g., Swift, 41 U.S. at 19–20; see also BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 26–32.
8. 304 U.S. 64, 74–80 (1938) (holding, in part, that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State,” which is
“not a matter of federal concern” but rather “shall be declared by [the State’s] Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision”); see also BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 132 (“Originally, federal
courts applied the law merchant as general law in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, subject to
any alterations or displacement by local state law. Once states abandoned judicial application of general
law such as the law merchant in favor of local state law, Erie eventually interpreted the Constitution to
require federal courts to apply state law in the absence of an applicable provision of the Constitution or a
federal statute.”).
9. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 113–34. Bellia and Clark assert:
The law maritime encompassed both public matters governed by the law of state-state relations
(such as prize cases) and private transactions governed by general maritime law (such as maritime commerce)[,] . . . [and] provided a body of general law comparable to—and sometimes
overlapping with—the law merchant for cases within the jurisdiction of admiralty courts. As
Justice Joseph Story explained, admiralty jurisdiction was ‘divisible into two great branches,
one embracing captures, and questions of prize, arising jure belli; the other embracing acts,
torts, and injuries strictly of civil cognizance, independent of belligerent operations.’
Id. at 113–14.
10. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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based on general principles of maritime law, now mostly framed in Supreme
Court precedents, even if contrary to applicable state law.11 The third branch of
the law of nations—the law of state-state relations—defines duties and obligations among sovereign states.12 Bellia and Clark assert that “the Constitution was
designed to interact in distinct ways with each of the three traditional branches of
the law of nations that existed when it was adopted.”13
The three branches of the law of nations that Bellia and Clark theorize are not
created equal in their account:14 the law of state-state relations is paramount.15
First, they assert, the law of state-state relations is an important interpretive tool
because it helps to explain the original meanings of many of the foreign relations
provisions in the Constitution.16 For instance, the law of state-state relations generated the list of war powers in Article I, Section 8: “To declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water.”17 To understand what “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” are, we must look
to the law-of-nation treatise writers consulted by early Americans; the two most
prominent such writers were William Blackstone and Emer de Vattel.18 Likewise,
it is the law of state-state relations, again as set forth in eighteenth-century
11. 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law
which shall prevail throughout the country. . . . And . . . in the absence of some controlling statute the
general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to
matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted); see also BELLIA & CLARK,
supra note 1, at 128–31 (analyzing the Court’s decision in Jensen, including the precedential effect of its
holding “that general maritime law operates as preemptive federal law in some instances because Article
III’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction incorporates it as federal law”).
12. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 73–112 (discussing the evolution and historical
applications of the law of state–state relations protecting nations’ “territorial sovereignty” with “limited
exceptions”).
13. Id. at xiii.
14. See, e.g., id. at 131 (explaining that the law maritime is the only of the three branches “that the
Supreme Court has found to be incorporated as federal law by an Article III jurisdictional grant”).
15. See id. at 269 (“For the Founders, the most important branch of the law of nations to the
collective interests of the United States was the law of state-state relations.”).
16. See id. at 50 (“It is not possible to understand [the Article I and Article II grants of foreign
relations] powers—let alone determine their effect—without consulting background principles of the
law of nations against which they were drafted and ratified.”). See generally MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007) (explaining the “interpretive power” of the law of
nations in the realm of international affairs).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
18. See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769);
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS in NATURAL LAW AND ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS 1
(Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).
Blackstone’s Commentaries and Vattel’s Law of Nations were the first two books the Senate bought
for its library in 1794. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 65 (1794) (“Ordered, That the Secretary purchase
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Vattel’s Law of Nature and Nations, for the use of the Senate.”).
Vattel’s book was a monograph focused exclusively on the law of nations. Blackstone’s four-volume
treatise covered all of English law, and included a brief but highly-influential discussion of the law of
nations in Volume 4. On the influence of Blackstone, see Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and
the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 738–47 (1976). On
Vattel’s importance to early American statesmen and jurists, see Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the
Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1061–67
(2002).
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treatises, that illuminates distinctions between similar constitutional words like
“Treaties”19 and “Agreement or Compact,”20 and as among “Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls.”21 The law merchant and maritime law do not have
the same dictionary leverage in constitutional interpretation, except that the latter
helps to ascertain the scope of the national “judicial Power,”22 that extends “to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”23
Second, the law of state-state relations, according to Bellia and Clark, is the
only one of the three fields of the traditional law of nations that survives as federal
judge-made law binding on the states in a significant way.24 True, the peacetime
enclave of maritime law persists because of Jensen, despite its tension with the
holding in Erie.25 But the enactment of federal statutes has dramatically narrowed
federal judicial power to make law for the seas, which in turn, has declined in significance following the transformations in transportation technology since the
age of sail which have rendered maritime transport more reliable and secure. By
contrast, given increasing globalization, the law of state-state relations arises in
federal courts in greater and more diverse contexts whenever the laws, judgments, or acts of foreign states or officials are implicated in a suit in federal
court.26 The paradigmatic example of this branch of the law of nations is the act
of state doctrine, which requires federal courts to abstain from passing on the legality of the acts of foreign sovereigns within their jurisdictions, regardless
whether state law would permit a U.S. court to do so.27 Bellia and Clark make a
general claim that, like the act of state doctrine, “[l]ong-standing Supreme Court
precedent supports the proposition that courts must uphold the traditional rights
of foreign sovereigns under the law of state-state relations against the conflicting
demands of state law.”28
Bellia and Clark’s historical account draws more modest missions of restraint
and abstention for the judicial branch vis-a`-vis the national political branches in
matters touching upon U.S. foreign policy and relations. The Constitution grants
to Congress and the President the powers to recognize foreign nations, wage war,
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
21. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
22. Id. art. III, § 1.
23. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he Constitution’s exclusive allocation of specific
foreign relations powers to the political branches preempts state law that would deny foreign nations
their traditional rights under the law of state-state relations.”).
25. Cf. id. at 115, 128–29 (describing the Court’s “contrast[ing]” holdings in Erie and Jensen).
26. See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018)
(reversing Second Circuit’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 to require binding
deference to Chinese government regarding Chinese law in an amicus brief filed in federal district court
urging reversal of a jury verdict against Chinese vitamin-C manufacturers for violating the Sherman
Act).
27. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act of state
doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity
of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”).
28. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 245.
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regulate commerce, and conduct diplomatic relations with foreign sovereigns.29
Accordingly, Bellia and Clark assert that “judicial respect for the rights of recognized foreign states under the law of nations has served to uphold recognition of
foreign nations and governments by the political branches.”30 This insight enables
a neat and logical rejoinder to advocates’ efforts to vindicate customary international law-based human rights claims in U.S. federal courts. If the courts did pass
on the legality of foreign sovereign acts and afford remedies to private litigants,
they would transgress on “the political branches[’] exclusive authority over the
accepted means of pursuing redress against foreign nations.”31 In other words,
Bellia and Clark argue that the traditional law of nations field of state-state relations, grounded in the principle that one sovereign may not challenge what
another sovereign does within its borders and committed to the political branches
under the Constitution, trumps the customary international law of human rights
of more recent vintage.
In this way, Bellia and Clark fashion a new history-based contribution to
current debates about the status and role of customary international law and how
federal courts should respond when they encounter it. The majority view among
U.S. foreign relations scholars is that modern customary international law is always
federal law, entitled to Supremacy Clause effect on par with the Constitution, treaties, and congressional statutes, and therefore binding on the states.32 As support for
their position, these scholars invoke iconic historical statements of the Supreme
Court, statesmen, and jurists, that proclaim the law of nations as the law of the
United States.33 The most famous of these is Justice Horace Gray’s ringing endorsement in The Paquete Habana: “International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”34
29. See id. at xix–xxii. Bellia and Clark do not take a position on how separation-of-powers disputes
between these two political branches should be resolved. See id. at 232 (“We do not attempt to
determine the precise allocation of war and foreign relations powers between Congress and the
President”).
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 270.
32. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824,
1825–27 (1998) (defending the position that customary international law is federal law in response to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith’s article, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997)).
33. See generally, Koh, supra note 32, at 1830–41 (discussing the “history and doctrine,” including
Supreme Court precedent, “invoke[d]” in one such scholarly account).
34. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Bellia and Clark correctly point out that Gray’s statement involved the
now-extinct field of maritime prize law, over which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction and
where it was widely accepted that federal judge-made law displaced all state laws. See BELLIA &
CLARK, supra note 1, at 145 & n.20, 163–64, 218–19. Blackstone’s remark in his Commentaries is as
often cited as canonical support for the view that the law of nations was part of England’s common law:
“the law of nations . . . is here adopted in it[s] full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of
the law of the land.” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67; see also William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law, Change, and the Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2018).
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More recently, scholars seeking to revise the majority view have asserted that
customary international law is not presumptively federal law that preempts state
law.35 These revisionists dismiss historical statements, including such statements
affirming the law of nations as the law of the United States, as artifacts of a
bygone era, retired by the iconic Erie decision. They conclude that modern customary international law warrants no recognition as federal law in any circumstance, whether as a hook for obtaining federal court jurisdiction or as an
independent body of law generating rules of decision that preempt contrary state
law.36 A third group of scholars takes the middle ground and asserts that customary international law is non-binding general law analogous to the law merchant.37
Bellia and Clark’s thesis that the law of nations operated differently across
their three designated subject matters eschews the all-or-nothing approach of
both the majority who claim that customary international law is always federal
law, and the revisionists who claim that it is not. According to Bellia and Clark,
the enduring law of state-state relations is still federal law that preempts state
law, but “[m]odern customary international law represents a new and distinct
branch of international law.”38 They assert that federal courts should not view
this new customary international law, most prominently human rights norms outside of U.S. ratified treaties, as preemptive federal law because to do so with
encroach upon the traditional law of state-state relations entrusted to the political
branches.
Their argument is novel, but its takeaway approximates the revisionists’ conclusion: federal judges should leave diplomacy and foreign affairs to the national
political branches and abstain from recognizing individual-rights claims under
customary international law as federal law. Bellia and Clark depart from the revisionists on one prescription: their acceptance of the displacement of state law
in the traditional law-of-nations field of state-state relations. “The Constitution’s allocation of powers—understood in historical context and as applied by
the Supreme Court in practice—requires U.S. courts to apply some rules of customary international law to preempt state law.”39 But this point of difference,
ironically, makes them even more hostile than the revisionists to the modern customary international law of human rights. This is because their thesis gives
U.S. courts a federal law basis—namely, the law of state-state relations—for
35. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32 (“We have argued that, in the absence of
federal political branch authorization, [customary international law (CIL)] is not a source of federal law.
Certain doctrinal consequences follow from this argument. First, as a general matter, a case arising
under CIL would not by that fact alone establish federal question jurisdiction. Second, federal court
interpretations of CIL would not be binding on the federal political branches or the states.”); Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 716–21, 717 n.185
(1986) (arguing against “judicial application of customary international law” due to “the incompatibility
of the process of [its] formation with American political philosophy”).
36. See Trimble, supra note 35, at 678–84.
37. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L. L. 365, 369–70 (2002).
38. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 166.
39. Id. at 268 (emphasis removed).
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declining to entertain such human rights claims, even when they are framed as
state-law claims40 or as customary international law presented as state-law claims
in accordance with Bradley and Goldsmith’s revisionist understanding. And this
would be true in state or in federal court, because the federal law of state-state
relations would be binding on state judges, too.41
II. WHAT WAS THE LAW OF NATIONS
Bellia and Clark’s division of the law of nations into three branches is bold and
new, but I am not so sure it is right. To start with, their tripartite characterization of
the law of nations was not used near the time of the Founding; rather, the most common subject-matter division in the law of nations at that time was between the laws
of war and the laws of peace. 42 Nevertheless, their scheme has a certain appeal
because it corresponds roughly to the subject matter of many cases on the dockets of
the early federal courts—admiralty, commercial law, and prize law. Interestingly,
the very branch of the law of nations that Bellia and Clark emphasize—the law of
state-state relations—came up most frequently in prize cases during the United
States’ first century. Prize law was the wartime branch of maritime law, just as admiralty law was its peacetime half. Bellia and Clark frame prize cases as “part of
the larger law of state-state relations,” citing Blackstone.43 But Blackstone does
not refer to “disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom
bills”44 as being governed by the law of state-state relations.45 Indeed, the law of
“shipwrecks”—for example, who owns a shipwreck, or what is the reward under
the law of salvage for saving cargo from a sinking ship—seems to bear no direct
connection to the law of state-state relations. Instead, what Blackstone does say
about the law that should decide such “disputes relating to prizes” is that “there
is no other rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from history
and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally approved
and allowed of.”46 What this example illustrates is that Blackstone and other
Founding-era sources did not perceive Bellia and Clark’s distinction among three
branches of the law of nations, but instead saw it as one undifferentiated body of
rules of decision distilled “from history and usage” and from “generally approved”
international scholars.
In my opinion, Bellia and Clark’s definition does incomplete justice to the
breadth and nuance of the law of nations as understood by Americans at the time

40. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 1999) (California statute authorizing redress for
victims of foreign slave labor, with an eye to affording redress to victims of Japanese imperial
aggression during World War II).
41. Bellia and Clark do not explicitly say that the law of state-state relations is “the law of the United
States” under the Supremacy Clause, but that seems to be a logical inference from their argument.
42. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, 1 THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND OF PEACE, reprinted in NATURAL LAW AND
ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS (Richard Tuck ed., 2005) (1625).
43. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 117 & n.7.
44. Id. (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67).
45. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
46. Id.
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of the Constitution’s adoption and initial implementation. It is under-inclusive of
how the law of nations interacts with the U.S. Constitution in four key respects:
the law of nations (1) was sometimes a broad term for all international law, including conventions or treaties—the “conventional” law of nations; (2) included principles of domestic law perceived to be shared by all civilized nations; (3) was a
source of the U.S. law of federalism, given the early American view that the states
retained residual sovereignty beyond what was conferred on the new general government by the Constitution; and (4) was perceived in part as unwritten natural
law.
First, a common usage of “law of nations” in the late eighteenth century was as
an umbrella term equivalent to “international law” today. This usage would have
included not only customs, but conventions or treaties. Indeed, Vattel referred to
treaties as the “conventional law of nations.”47 Professors Cleveland and Dodge
have recently argued that this umbrella meaning of “law of nations” is the proper
reading of Article I’s grant of power to Congress “[t]o define and punish . . .
Offences against the Law of Nations.”48 Recognizing the possibility of this
broader usage is essential to interpreting other Founding-era references to the
“law of nations” and, consequently, their relevance and ramifications for the present day.
Second, Bellia and Clark’s tripartite subject-matter formulation neglects a subset of the law of nations that was central to early American jurists: principles of
law shared by the domestic legal systems of all civilized nations. These principles
are still considered one of the three primary sources of international law today, as
the Statute of the modern International Court of Justice explicitly states.49 A “universal” principle was one that all sovereigns shared; a “general” principle was
one that most sovereigns shared.50 The basic idea was that the legal systems and
jurisprudence of all civilized nations shared certain basic principles. Domestic
constitutions reflected these principles, but they were not constitutive of them;
nor could they destroy them.
Blackstone described this branch of the law of nations with characteristic
lucidity:
[T]he law of nations . . . is here adopted in it[s] full extent by the common
law . . . . And those acts of parliament . . . made to enforce this universal law,
or to facilitate the execution of it[s] decisions, are not to be considered as

47. VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 24, at 77.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations”). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses
Under Treaties, 124 YALE L. J. 2202 (2015).
49. The statute identifies three primary sources of international law for the International Court of
Justice to apply: treaties; “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;” and
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38, ¶ 1.
50. See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
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introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental
constitutions of the kingdom[,] without which it must cease to be a part of the
civilized world.51

In his “Law of Nations” entry for the Encyclopedia Americana, Justice Joseph
Story divided the law of nations into “external” and “internal” halves.52 His external law of nations correspondeds roughly to Bellia and Clark’s three subject matters, especially the law of state-to-state relations.53 The internal law of nations,
Story reasoned, was synonymous with the “public law of the state.”54 This branch
of the law of nations included two types of enacted positive laws (laws “from positive institution”) and laws arising from “the principles of natural justice”55—
comprising Story’s formulation of the general principles of domestic law shared
by civilized nations.56 This is what Blackstone had earlier referred to as the “universal law” that was incorporated into the common law ensuring that England
was “a part of the civilized world.”57
It is difficult to convey just how important the “general principles of domestic
law” branch of the law of nations was to American constitutionalism in its first
century. A famous example may suffice to make the point. The doctrine of
national constitutional limits on “personal jurisdiction” in state courts now makes
its home in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that was
not the legal basis of the iconic decision that created the doctrine.58 The constitutional holding in Pennoyer v. Neff was based on general principles of the law of
nations.59 The question in Pennoyer was whether an Oregon court could enforce
a judgment against a nonresident when the plaintiff did not serve process on the
defendant in Oregon or attach the defendant’s property in Oregon before bringing

51. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
52. See Joseph Story, Law of Nations, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 141–49 (Francis Lieber ed.,
Phila., Thomas, Coperthwait & Co. 1838); see also id. at 141 (“It would be . . . correct . . . to divide [the
law of nations] into two great leading heads, namely, the internal law of nations, or that which arises
from the relations between the sovereign and the people, and the external law of nations, or that which
arises from the relations between different nations.”).
53. Cf id. (defining the external law of nations as synonymous with “international law” and
“divisible into two heads, the one which regulates the rights, intercourse and obligations of nations, as
such, with each other; the other, which regulates the rights and obligations more immediately belonging
to their respective subjects,” with “[t]he former . . . frequently denominated the public law of nations,
and the latter the private law of nations”).
54. Id. at 141 (emphasis removed).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
58. U.S. CONST. amd. XIV. The state court judgment at issue in Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 U.S. 714
(1878), had been rendered in February 1866, id. at 719, more than two years before the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in July 1868. Id. at 733 (“Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their
enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due
process of law.”).
59. See id.
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suit.60 Justice Stephen Field’s opinion for the Court held that it could not: “The
authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the
State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those
limits would be deemed in every other forum . . . an illegitimate assumption
of power.”61 Justice Field described this as “a principle of general, if not universal, law.”62 This principle was actually:
[T]wo well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of
an independent State over persons and property. . . . One of these principles is
that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory. . . . The other principle of public law referred
to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.63

In support of these principles, Field cited two authorities: Joseph Story’s treatise on the conflict of laws and Henry Wheaton’s treatise on international law.64 It
is worth pausing to consider the magnitude of what the majority’s decision stands
for in terms of constitutional decisionmaking by the Supreme Court at the time.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer was based not on any constitutional
text, hypothesized original meaning, prior Supreme Court precedent, or historical
practice. A landmark constitutional holding was justified exclusively on the basis
of general principles of the law of nations as derived from leading treatises.
Finding general principles of domestic law among civilized nations from the
“internal” branch of the law of nations as set out by treatise-writers was a vital
conduit for interaction between the law of nations and the U.S. Constitution in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet it is entirely absent from Bellia and
Clark’s analysis. The reason for the lacuna, in my view, is that Bellia and Clark
focus exclusively on customary international law when looking to the historical
law of nations. American lawyers today tend to bifurcate international law into
only treaties and customs, ignoring the existence of general principles despite
their standing as a third primary source of international law even today.65 But
acknowledging that the traditional law of nations included a concept of best practices among civilized nations is necessary to uncover an accurate understanding
of the significance of the law of nations for the U.S. Constitution from the
Founding to the end of the nineteenth century.

60. Id. at 715–19.
61. Id. at 720.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 722.
64. See id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Bos., Hilliard, Gray,
& Co. 1834) and HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Phila., Carey, Lea &
Blanchard 1836)).
65. Bellia and Clark, for example, do not identify general principles of law as a category of
international law in their book. See generally BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1.
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Moreover, the documented reliance on the general principles branch of the law
of nations for constitutional rulings vis-a`-vis the states and citizens in the United
States’ first century has important potential consequences for today. First, it
would seem to support the controversial modern practice of the Supreme Court’s
turning to customary international law norms and the best practices of other modern jurisprudential systems to interpret the U.S. Constitution.66 Second, modern
international lawyers recognize a subset of international law norms called jus
cogens—norms that are so fundamental to the community of civilized nations
that they cannot be contracted out of by treaty or otherwise shirked by any sovereign state.67 The most commonly acknowledged jus cogens norms are prohibitions against torture, slavery and the slave trade, and genocide.68
Given the resemblance between the rationales for the modern jus cogens and
the traditional logic of the “internal” law of nations, a strong argument might be
made that jus cogens human rights norms should be treated as binding federal
law that preempts contrary state law. Bellia and Clark’s law of state-state relations provides no affirmative defense to this argument because eighteenth-century
Anglo-American jurists like Blackstone agreed that general principles were principles “without which . . . [a country] must cease to be a part of the civilized
world.”69 Although Bellia and Clark’s thesis provides an unsatisfactory rejoinder,
I think that they are ultimately right that the U.S. constitutional framework would
not permit an international norm of substantive conduct (against slavery, for
example) to preempt state law if written federal law (the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties) did not independently frame the norm. But, as I will demonstrate in
Part III, this is because of a political fact—the nature of the founding American
conception of sovereignty—not because of the law of state-state relations, as
Bellia and Clark posit.
Pennoyer powerfully illustrates not only the second way in which Bellia and
Clark’s conception of the law of nations is under-inclusive, but also the third
way: the law of nations was a source of the federal law of interstate relations, not

66. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“at least from the time of the Court’s
decision in Trop [v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)], the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and
to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
67. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States has not ratified but
which is widely accepted as consistent with customary international law on this point, provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980).
68. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
69. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
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just international relations.70 At the Founding, the several United States were
each perceived to possess sovereignty analogous to a fully sovereign state, except
for the powers ceded to the new national government in the Constitution.71
Consequently, “the founding generation borrowed from the law of nations to
address issues of constitutional federalism (certainly a far more useful compass in
this respect than English common law) in their statebuilding project.”72 By this I
mean that early American constitutionalism took rules of the law of nations and
applied them directly to interstate relations, not as an analogy or inspiration.
Pennoyer is again the perfect example. General principles of the internal law of
nations not only were used to make a constitutional ruling, but also were applied
to decide disputes between American states, not between the United States or its
citizens and a foreign state.73 That is to say, Pennoyer can be read not only as an
application of the law of nations as a source of universal domestic legal principles, but also as applying the law of state-state relations to interstate relations in a
federal system in which the states were viewed as quasi-sovereign. This kind of
transposition of the law of state-state relations to the law of U.S. federalism was
exceedingly common in the early and young United States.74
Fourth and finally, there was a jurisprudential aspect of the law of nations
absent in Bellia and Clark’s account that is extinct today but was dominant at the
time of the Founding. A part of the law of nations was understood to be the law of
nature. Vattel made this explicit in the title of his treatise, “The Law of Nations,
or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations
and Sovereigns.”75 Blackstone likewise described the law of nations as “a system
of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among
the civilized inhabitants of the world.”76
But what did it mean that the law of nations was natural law or natural reason?
To answer this question, we begin with what preceded those eighteenth-century
jurists. Hugo Grotius is widely viewed as the father of modern international
law.77 In jurisprudential terms, however, he was a transitional figure between medieval and modern. He was transitional because he perceived faith and science as
one seamless whole in a way that eighteenth-century thinkers would not. Grotius
was both a lawyer and a theologian. He believed that the Christian Bible was the
Word of God, and that it was directly relevant to law in practice, not just to

70. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1039 (framing the Eleventh Amendment’s command that the U.S.
judicial power “shall not be construed to extend to any suit” against a state by citizens or subjects of
foreign states or citizens of other states as manifesting the concept of sovereign equality borrowed from
contemporaneous international law).
71. See id. at 1050–51.
72. Id. at 1031.
73. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
74. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1064-66.
75. VATTEL, supra note 18.
76. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *66.
77. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury &
Adam Roberts eds., 1990).
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standards of moral conduct. It is difficult for the modern mind, much less the
modern legal mind, to grasp what this mentalite´ entailed.
Grotius’s understanding of the connection between the law of nations and natural law might best be demonstrated by examining what he considered valid forms
of proof in the Preliminary Discourse (Prolegomena) to his magnum opus, On the
Law of War and Peace.78 Grotius stressed the importance of the Old and New
Testaments of the Bible to his proofs of the law of nature: “The Authority of those
Books which Men inspired by God, either writ or approved of, I often use.”79 He
is referring here to the law of nature as the source of the rules that govern human
beings. The law of nations, however, was the law of nature as it governed societies of human beings organized as nations.
This second-order nature of the law of nations entailed a different method of
proof in Grotius’ view. Histories drawn from Greek and Roman antiquity and
from Europe after the fall of the Roman empire were the principal sources of rules,
not the Bible or Christian moral writers: “the Law of Nature, as we have already
said, is in some Measure proved from [the Bible], but of the Law of Nations there
is no other Proof but this.”80 At the same time, the principles of natural law “are
manifest and self-evident, almost after the same Manner as those Things are that
we perceive with our outward Senses.”81 But, for Grotius, the “Law of Nations”
encompassed not only “Inference drawn from the Principles of Nature” but also
norms based on “an universal Consent.”82 Grotius described this latter type of the
law of nations, which Vattel would call the “voluntary law of nations,”83 as “that
which cannot be deduced from certain Principles by just Consequences, and yet
appears to be every where observed, [and which] must owe its rise to a free and arbitrary Will.”84 As Vattel acknowledged, this consensual or voluntary law of
nations could, counterintuitively, include rules of conduct that seemed “in their
own nature unjust and condemnable” but that all nations are presumed to have
consented to “because they cannot oppose them by open force.”85 In other words,
a part of the law of nations drawn from the law of nature included some norms that
departed from natural justice but were everywhere “observed” or “self evident.”
Vattel, whose Law of Nations was published in 1758, more than 130 years after
Grotius’s The Rights of War and Peace, shared with Grotius a belief that the law
of nations was grounded in natural law. However, Vattel’s secular and scientific
vision of natural law diverged from Grotius’s classical and theological view.
Vattel opined: “The law of nations is the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See GROTIUS, supra note 42.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 21, at 76.
GROTIUS, supra note 42, at *66.
VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 21, at 76.
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rights.”86 For Vattel, the rules of the law of nations were derived solely from empirical observations of how the world worked, not from faith, natural justice, or the
received wisdom of antiquity. As Carl Becker memorably put it, Vattel and other
eighteenth-century philosophers, “having denatured God . . deified Nature.”87
Consequently, Vattel’s proofs focused primarily on contemporary case studies, less
frequently on classical ones, and never on biblical sources, by contrast to Grotius.
At the same time, Vattel preserved Grotius’s idea that a core set of the law of
nations followed from natural-law principles as distinguished from the conventional law of nations (such as treaties) and the customary law of nations.88 Just as
the conventional law of nations was based on explicit consent, the customary law
of nations, Vattel reasoned, was “founded on a tacit consent”—as distinguished
from the “universal consent” of the natural-law law of nations—and so was “not
obligatory except on those nations who have adopted it.”89 Because the specific
norms agreed to by states in both of these two non-natural-law branches of the
law of nations were specific to the terms of the treaty or custom in question,
Vattel asserted that a discussion of their “particulars does not belong in a systematic treatise on the law of nations,” which was his project.90 To summarize, the
rules that Vattel described in his book were limited solely to the rules that were
ordained by natural law, understood as an empirical science. This basic bifurcation of the law of nations is often missed or misunderstood by modern jurists and
commentators like Bellia and Clark whose work acknowledges the heavy reliance
of the American Founders on Vattel.
The natural-law mindset of late eighteenth-century jurists exemplified by
Vattel produced significant consequences for the interaction between the law of
nations and the U.S. Constitution. As a general matter, as noted above, the naturallaw part of the law of nations (that which was neither convention nor custom) was
perceived as a body of law that could be discovered or found by empirical observation and applied to decide specific cases, much like the laws of gravity could be
applied to specific physics problems. This was not so different, jurisprudentially
speaking, from the common law, which is perhaps why Blackstone perceived the
law of nations and the common law as integrated: “the law of nations . . . is here
adopted in it[s] full extent by the common law.”91 Under this paradigm, what
judges do when they decide cases stands in contrast to what the political branches
do when they “make” written laws or treaties. At the same time, it was believed
that the outcomes of cases were consistent at a systemic level and could be decided
by universal or general principles.92 This in turn engendered reliance on treatise
writers or publicists like Vattel who gathered, analyzed, and organized relevant
86. VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 3, at 67.
87. CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 63 (1932).
88. See VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., §§ 24–25, at 77–78 (emphasis added) (distinguishing law of
nations principles including the conventional and the customary laws of nations).
89. Id., intro., § 25, at 77.
90. Id.
91. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
92. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
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case studies, rather than on direct empirical examinations by judges (or juries) to
find the applicable rules of the law of nations.93 As Blackstone put it, “this great
universal law” was “collected from history and usage, and such writers of all
nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of.”94
Second, with specific regard to the U.S. Constitution, conceiving of a significant part of the law of nations as natural law explains some textual ambiguities in
the written document. The first ambiguity concerns the Supremacy Clause. One
argument that the law of nations—and, accordingly, modern customary international law—is not federal law which preempts state law is anchored in the plain
language of the Supremacy Clause. That provision states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.95

The law of nations is unmentioned. Why? To the extent that the subject was
the natural law part of the law of nations, it would not have occurred to early
American jurists that state constitutions and laws could diverge from natural law,
requiring resort to the Supremacy Clause as a tiebreaker. Natural law jurists at the
time understood that local customs regarding local activities, business, and property could take diverse, heterogeneous forms, even within one nation, just as
Vattel’s conventional and customary law of nations bound no one but those that
had explicitly or tacitly consented. But as Blackstone observed, it was believed
that the law of nations must be “adopted in it[s] full extent” as the fundamental
law of a state (that is, by its constitution and statutes) if it were to be counted as
“part of the civilized world,”96 which the American states surely considered
themselves. That takes care of the natural law portion of the law of nations. The
conventional law of nations—namely, treaties—is also explicitly mentioned in
the Supremacy Clause.97 And what Vattel called the customary law of nations, at
least to the extent that it corresponded to the law of state-state relations, also preempts state law, at least according to Bellia and Clark.98
But I wonder if the debate about whether the law of nations preempted state
law is overblown. As a practical matter, rules of the law of nations in the late
eighteenth-century were found for the most part in treatises, not defined in

93. As noted above, Justice Field’s majority opinion in Pennoyer relied on two preeminent
nineteenth-century treatise writers, Joseph Story and Henry Wheaton. See id. at 722. The authoritative
treatises had changed in the intervening century—Blackstone and Vattel were no longer the state of the
art—but the method was the same.
94. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
95. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
96. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *67.
97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
98. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 44–48.
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authoritative legal texts like the Constitution, congressional statutes, and treaties of the United States. Thus, there would have been no felt need for a constitutional provision ordering state judges to privilege federal written legal texts
over conflicting state legal texts, because the law of nations did not have an authoritative legal text. And that is the only thing that the express language of the
Supremacy Clause purports to do.
The second ambiguity about constitutional text is whether the constitutional
words “the Laws of the United States” includes the “law of nations.”99 Those
words arise in two different contexts: in (1) the Supremacy Clause, which, as we
have seen, provides that “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land;”100 and
(2) Article III, Section 2, which provides that the judicial power “shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.”101 With respect to the Supremacy Clause, the use of the word “made”
strongly suggests that “Laws of the United States” did not include the law of
nations. As discussed above, the natural law part of the law of nations was found
or discovered, not made.102
The absence of “made” in Article III with respect to “the Laws of the United
States” makes that provision a more difficult call. On the one hand, the same language in the Supremacy Clause—“the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof”—could have been used in Article III without any
alteration of meaning, but it was not. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent has
tended to construe constitutional “arising under” jurisdiction broadly, on the
assumption that Congress does not have to vest all of the constitutional “arising
under” judicial power and can limit the terms of its grant by jurisdictional statute.103 These are two arguments in favor of including the law of nations as part of
the “Laws of the United States” in Article III’s specification of arising-under
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the use of the plural form “the Laws of the United States”
points in the direction of statutes only, because the singular form—“the Law of
the United States”—seems more consistent with an open-ended reading, like the
“law of nations.” Moreover, as noted above, the law of nations was understood to
be an unwritten body of rules drawn from history, usage, or respected treatise

99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
100. Id.
101. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article II, Section 3 separately commands that the President “shall take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. But that reference seems limited to
“Laws” enacted by Congress; regardless, it would be an odd usage to say that the law of nations are
“executed.”
102. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
833, 845 (2007).
103. See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 764 (1824) (distinguishing between
the breadth of Article III judicial power over cases “arising under” federal law and the limited scope of
“arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to congressional statutory grant).
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writers to decide cases or controversies brought before the federal courts. It seems
odd to assert that such a case or controversy was one arising under the rule of decision, rather than in federal court by virtue of party alignment (for example, citizen-citizen diversity) or subject matter (for example, admiralty), or under a
written statute or constitutional provision. As a prudential matter, the same ambiguity that makes the phrase “law of nations” so difficult to understand pushes
against the conclusion that the use of “the laws of the United States” in a jurisdictional provision includes the law of nations. It seems preferable for jurisdictional
provisions to be straightforward and easy to police, so as to preclude litigation over
non-merits jurisdictional issues. If “Laws of the United States” did include “law of
nations,” then there would be more doubt about which cases “aris[e] under” it, by
comparison to a construction limited solely to statutes of the United States.
On balance, my view is that the “the Laws of the United States” in Article III
probably referred only to statutes, although the cases now suggest it encompasses
federal common law.104 In addition to the points made above in favor of that position, it seems that the only argument against it is the inference of a broader meaning
from the absence of the Supremacy Clause phrase “which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.” There is, however, no affirmative evidence that the difference
was intended to be meaningful. In that situation, it seems preferable to construe the
Article III use of “the Laws of the United States” to align with its use in Article VI.
To summarize Part II, the law of nations had a richer and deeper meaning than
Bellia and Clark have postulated. “Law of nations” was sometimes an umbrella
term for all international law, including treaties and general principles of domestic law shared by civilized nations. These general principles occasionally supplied rules of decision in constitutional cases. The law of nations was also a
source of law for the Supreme Court in interstate cases perceived as analogous to
international cases because of the belief that the states retained a large measure of
residual sovereignty, especially from the Founding to the Civil War. Finally, the
law of nations at the Founding and thereafter was perceived in part as natural law,
subject to discovery by empirical study and the systematic analysis of treatise
writers. This fact has consequences for how we understand what federal judges
were doing when they engaged the historical law of nations in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and for the original meanings of the Supremacy Clause and
of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction.
The upshot is that although Bellia and Clark are correct that the law of
nations is neither monolithic nor a simple synonym for modern customary international law, the historical interaction between the law of nations—when properly understood—and the U.S. Constitution is too complicated to come away
with a pat conclusion about what history teaches us. Bellia and Clark have opened
up a Pandora’s box, but their thesis leaves many questions unanswered. In the

104. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (dismissing original action on the view that
district courts have arising-under jurisdiction over federal common law claims alleging pollution of
navigable waters).
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following Parts, I will attempt to bring some order to the confusion, starting with
the relationship between the law of nations and the judiciary branch of the
national government. The basic theme of Part III is to demonstrate how the
Framers envisioned a more active and dynamic role for the judiciary in foreign
relations than Bellia and Clark have asserted.
III. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE JUDICIARY BRANCH
The law of nations, in all its rich complexity as described above, was the
national judiciary’s toolbox for resolving sensitive foreign policy disputes that
came to it through the Constitution’s grants of judicial power and the First
Congress’s selective implementation of the constitutional grants in the 1789
Judiciary Act. The President, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate, makes treaties that are “the supreme Law of the Land,” state laws notwithstanding.105 Congress, with the consent of both houses and presentment to
the President,106 makes statutes that are likewise supreme over state laws.
The law of nations was the analogous responsibility of the judiciary branch.
Unlike treaties and statutes, however, it was not codified in written form according to a constitutionally prescribed political process of advice-and-consent or
bicameralism-and-presentment, but it was instead found by judges (and sometimes juries)107 and applied to the facts of specific cases. As discussed above, it
was also theoretically impossible for a natural-law rule of the law of nations to
conflict with state constitutions or laws despite room for diversity as to local customs. So there was no felt need to write into the Supremacy Clause explicit guidance to state judges ordering them to reconcile authoritative federal and state
legal texts in favor of the federal, at least as far as the natural-law law of nations
was concerned.
In the late eighteenth century, American lawyers, statesmen, and federal courts
found the natural-law part of the law of nations primarily in British and European
treatises.108 In the nineteenth century, as the Supreme Court and lower federal
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
106. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States”).
107. Professor Ritz writes:
Even the jury, in the eighteenth century, was viewed as collegially involved in the judicial
search for “the law.” Juries not only found the facts, but they also had the final word as to
what the law was. There was no need to “report” these jury determinations on the law since
they would not be binding in any other court, nor for that matter in the same court in a different controversy.
WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS,
CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 30 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1989).
108. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1063 (“Vattel’s authority was so great before the courts that prior to
arguments before the federal circuit court in Richmond in 1790, Patrick Henry did not hesitate to send
his grandson 60 miles on horseback to look for the work that could permit him to win over the judges.”)
(quoting Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, in 3 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at iii, xxxvi (James Brown Scott ed., George D. Gregory & Charles
G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758)).
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courts produced more reasoned written opinions and juries were increasingly
constrained to deciding facts not law,109 federal courts turned to the written manifestations of their own jurisprudence and native treatise-writers like Story and
Wheaton to find the law of nations. Lower courts increasingly decided cases by
“following law” as declared in the written opinions of the Supreme Court.
In my opinion, this was a departure from the original law-of-nations paradigm
of “finding law,” in which the Supreme Court was not so much a superior court as
a primus inter pares trial court. In the old eighteenth-century model, judges and
juries were partners tasked with searching for the right rules in the treatises and
applying them to the specific facts of a case to bring the case to a close.110 The
language of Article III and its implementation in the 1789 Judiciary Act reflect an
original plan for the Supreme Court to function identically to the lower courts as
a trial court, but for bigger and more high-profile cases and with a new appellate
jurisdiction subject to congressional regulations and exceptions.111 Indeed,
Article III, by its explicit terms, does not require any federal courts besides the
Supreme Court, leaving it up to Congress to “ordain and establish” any “inferior
courts . . . from time to time.”112 In terms of rules of decision, it was a decentralized judicial system where all courts were to apply rules to facts. In cases and
controversies implicating the natural-law law of nations, the most important sources were the treatise writers. The idea of the appellate court decision as the primary source of rules of decision in future cases was in an embryonic phase.113
The sweeping success of the campaign led by Chief Justice John Marshall to
build the Court’s gravitas and institutional legitimacy and to transform it into a
“supreme” institution in a judicial hierarchy has blinded us to the original design
for the judicial branch.
In the new nineteenth-century model, the Supreme Court, wielding judicial
review and more robust appellate jurisdiction, jettisoned its trial court function
and became a “law declaring” institution. The transformation is perfectly captured by Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous assertion in Marbury v. Madison:
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”114 As a description of the role of the modern Supreme Court,
Marshall’s booming declaration is surely correct. But as a description of the
Supreme Court’s (and the lower federal courts’) primary role in the original

109. See RITZ, supra note 107, at 30 (“[A]ll eighteenth-century courts were trial courts having a
number of judges and juries all mutually engaged in ‘finding’ the true rule of law. In the twentieth
century the . . . jury has been excluded from the ‘lawmaking or law-finding process.”).
110. See id. at 27–32.
111. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations, as the Congress shall make.”).
112. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
113. See RITZ, supra note 107, at 44 (“In 1789, the principal characteristic of state judiciaries was
their horizontal arrangement. ‘Superior’ courts as well as ‘inferior’ court[s] were trial courts. The
important function of the superior courts was the trial function, not the appellate-review function”).
114. 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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constitutional framework, it is subject to doubt. A more accurate statement would
be: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to find the
law and apply it to the facts of cases brought before it.” To some extent, this function may require a statement of what the law is to satisfy the litigants and to provide guidance for analogous cases so future judges (and juries) do not have to
start from scratch. Even with respect to cases implicating the law of nations
where juries were not as relevant, early federal judges did not imagine themselves
as makers or systematizers of law-of-nations rules. They decided specific cases
and resolved controversies. The exception that proves the rule are judges like
James Kent and Joseph Story who were also treatise writers.115
In this sense, the law of nations was the original constitutionally authorized
federal common law. By this I mean that the law of nations was the designated
source from which federal judges (and juries) were to discover and apply rules to
the facts of specific cases, analogous to what eighteenth-century state courts were
expected to do in the ordinary common law subjects of torts, property, and contracts. Today, we might call this judicial lawmaking, but “law finding” more
accurately captures how eighteenth-century federal and state judges would have
perceived their roles.
The one possible limitation to the license that the Article III grants of judicial
power gives to judges to discover and apply rules from the law of nations is the
authority to define and punish crimes against the law of nations.116 The constitutional power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations” is explicitly committed to Congress.117 Moreover, the power to decide (with a jury)
that a person has committed a crime unfixed by statute and to take away the person’s liberty not only implicates the individual Bill of Rights, but also governmental power of a magnitude that logically requires legislative sanction. Even so,
there are indications that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned just such a
power, and that it was believed to be particularly robust with respect to crimes on
the high seas, against neutrality, and involving foreign diplomats.118 George
Washington, for instance, gave this guidance as part of his Neutrality
Proclamation in 1793 during the war between Great Britain and France: “I have
given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to
be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the Courts of
the United States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or

115. Kent was a New York state judge and chancellor but was more famously known for his fourvolume Commentaries on American Law, published between 1826 and 1830, which was the canonical
reference on American law of the time. Joseph Story was a justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845, a professor at Harvard Law School, and also published highly regarded treaties on multiple
subjects including the U.S. Constitution, equity jurisprudence, and conflict of laws.
116. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding that the
federal courts lack common law jurisdiction to hear criminal cases in a case brought against a newspaper
for criminal libel against the President and Congress).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
118. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (issuing a grand jury
charge based on a violation of neutrality).
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any of them.”119 In United States v. Ravara,120 the first reported federal criminal
case, one of the indictments against the defendant for sending threatening letters
to the British minister in Philadelphia alleged a violation of the law of nations.121
The great impediment to understanding the full scope and nature of the judiciary’s Founding-era authority to find and apply the law of nations is the modern
lawyer’s need to characterize the law of nations as federal law or state law.
Modern U.S. lawyers, Bellia and Clark included, cannot help but see the potential
for a collision between federal and state law. Late eighteenth-century American
lawyers and judges did not have as fine-tuned a sense as their modern descendants
for conflict between federal and state law. First, as noted earlier, they thought that
the two bodies of law both were ordained by natural law and embodied the same
general principles, and so their prescriptions would coincide in most cases.
Second, they believed that local customs ruled local matters—property, family
relations, intra-state contracts, and the maintenance of peace and order—but that
these customs were logically confined to their respective regions.122 Thus, there
was not much perceived potential for conflict.
The one important possibility of conflict between the law of nations and state
laws that Americans at the Founding were plainly aware of involved the conventional law of nations—that is, treaty provisions codifying norms that were not yet
general principles of law. As noted in Part II, this was not viewed as part of the
natural-law law of nations, which was the only focus of Blackstone’s and Vattel’s
treatises. For example, there was no default law-of-nations rule regarding payment of preexisting debts to creditors between countries at war upon resumption
of peace. Accordingly, countries were free to negotiate the law of nations rule
they wanted by convention. Article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace between the
United States and Great Britain provided that “[i]t is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value,
in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”123 Nevertheless,
many states passed laws that conflicted with the treaty obligation, for instance, by
allowing payment of debts by state-issued paper currency, not convertible hard

119. Proclamation of Neutrality (April 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 1745-1799, at 430–31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). It may be that Washington intended
“law of nations” in its broadest usage, encompassing the conventional law of nations (treaties, for
example) such as the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.
120. 27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 16,122).
121. See John D. Gordan III, United States v. Joseph Ravara: “Presumptuous Evidence,” “Too Many
Lawyers,” and a Federal Common Law Crime, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 106, 138–41 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (discussing these and other facts
alleged in the case against the defendant, Ravara).
122. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) (acknowledging that state law, not general law,
applied to “rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character”).
123. Article IV of the Treaty of Peace was a particular target of state nullification by law and jury
verdicts. Definitive Treaty of Peace art. IV, U.S.–Gr. Brit., Sept 3. 1783, 8 Stat 80.
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currency.124 In my view, the Supremacy Clause—the only explicit constitutional
provision addressed to conflicts between state and federal law—was drafted to
provide a basis for challenging precisely these state laws passed to preempt the
1783 Treaty of Peace. By the same token, a rule of the customary law of nations
grounded in tacit consent, as opposed to explicit consent by treaty, might preempt
state law where a federal court found one to apply. The most likely sphere where
this might have occurred was in ambassadorial cases, as I will discuss below.
A careful examination of the grants of judicial power in Article III, Section
Two of the Constitution reveals how they were designed to give the newly created
federal judiciary power to deploy the law of nations in all four of its manifestations
discussed above to mediate international and interstate relations: (1) all international law, including treaties; (2) general principles of domestic law; (3) law of
state-state relations as law of federalism; and (4) law of nations as natural law.
When the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 and created the federal
court system, it did not implement all the constitutional grants. But the grants
Congress did enable, and the two usages of the phrase “law of nations” in that
landmark statute, also illuminate the importance of the law of nations to the role of
the judiciary at the Founding.
A. THE LAW OF NATIONS GRANTS IN ARTICLE III

Article III provides that the “judicial Power shall extend”125 to three categories
that plainly implicate the law of nations:
(1) “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;”126
(2) “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;”127
and
(3) “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”128

Part II discussed the “arising under” subheading with respect to whether
“Laws of the United States” includes the law of nations, concluding on balance
that it likely did not. The heading also includes treaties. Consequently, it directly
authorizes federal courts to hear suits alleging violations of treaty obligations—
the conventional law of nations. Additionally, late eighteenth-century treaties of
peace, amity, and commerce were succinct and imprecise in their provisions,

124. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1458 (describing the various ways that state legislatures,
judges, and juries sought to frustrate foreign and out-of-state creditors).
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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leaving gaps that natural law or customary law of nations could fill.129 For example, questions arose as early as the Neutrality Controversy of 1793 about the specific obligations owed to treaty partners fighting wars. On the one hand, there was
the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain; on the other, there was the Treaty of
Alliance with France. The United States was stuck in the middle of seemingly
conflicting treaty obligations when the two European powers went to war in
1793. Was a neutral state obligated to prosecute its nationals who voluntarily
joined the war against a treaty partner? Did the United States have an affirmative
duty to come to France’s aid in its war against Britain? The situation was so dire
that Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, at President George Washington’s
direction, famously wrote a letter to the Supreme Court justices seeking their
advice:
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces frequent
transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the US. These questions depend for their solution on the construction of our treaties, on the laws
of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land[.]130

Chief Justice John Jay refused to answer Jefferson’s questions, giving birth to
the “advisory opinion” bar.131 But he and his fellow federal judges would presumably have answered the questions based on “the construction of our treaties, the
laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land” had they been presented
in actual cases.
The second subheading of Article III, Section 2 extends judicial power to “all
Cases affecting ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”132 The word
“affecting” suggests expansive coverage, at least including any cases implicating ambassadorial and consular rights, privileges, and immunities. At the time
of the Founding, there were no multilateral treaties governing this subject matter as there are now; nor did bilateral treaties go into detail about diplomatic

129. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.–Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, U.S.–Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.–Prussia,
Sept. 10 1785, 8 Stat 84; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.–Morocco, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. 100. The
common basic commitments of these treaties were peace and freedom of navigation and entry of goods
and persons subject to fees chargeable at the rate obtained by the most favored nation. Although there
were additional terms unique to particular treaties, they generally did not address questions that might
arise in specific cases, for example, the immunities of ambassadors and their households in the judicial
courts of the receiving state.
130. Letter to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 520 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
131. See Letter of Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8,
1783), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488–89 (Henry P. Johnson ed.,
N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891) (“[T]he three departments of the government . . . being in certain
respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are considerations
which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions
alluded to . . . .”).
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 2.
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rights and immunities.133 Pertinent rules were found by consulting the law-ofnations treatise. Some rules were believed to be necessary law-of-nations rules,
such as the criminal immunity of an ambassador.134 Other rules, such as the
criminal immunity of consuls (as opposed to ambassadors or ministers), were
part of the customary law of nations binding on a state only insofar as it had
tacitly consented.135
The Original Jurisdiction Clause of the Constitution also mentions ambassadorial cases and uses the same phrase as the second subheading: “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”136 The Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction is the only judicial power that the Constitution’s plain
language prohibits Congress from altering. Article III states that “the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction”137 without any specification of congressional power to tamper with the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, by contrast, is subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.”138 And the plain language of the Constitution does not
require Congress to create any lower federal courts at all. Article III gives
Congress the discretion to “ordain and establish” lower courts “from time to
time.”139
Why did the Framers feel it necessary to prohibit Congress from divesting the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over ambassadorial cases? The explanation
is plain enough. At its Founding, the United States was a militarily weak, revolutionary republic. It needed to maintain peace with Great Britain, as well as with
France and Spain, the other European powers with possessions on American soil.
Equally as important, the U.S. economy was mostly agrarian and required trade
and commerce with Europe to sell its produce and lumber and to obtain tools and
other goods. Any incidents involving foreign ambassadors in the United States
might occasion diplomatic controversies and even war. Thus, it would be best to
have any ambassadorial disputes settled directly by the highest court in the land.
The exalted forum would show respect for the foreign ambassadors who represented their sovereigns and signal to them how seriously the young United States
regarded the matter.140 The same reasons would support the conclusion that any
ruling the Supreme Court would issue, for instance, on ambassadorial immunity,
would preempt any relevant state law.

133. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce art. XXV, U.S.–Prussia, supra note 128, at 7.
134. See VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. II, § 80, at 464.
135. See id., bk. I, § 34, at 148.
136. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. art. III, § 1.
140. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal:
Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1779 n.58 (2004).
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The third in the list of judicial powers plainly implicating the law of nations is
“all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”141 Because they identify maritime law as one of their three branches of the law of nations, Bellia and Clark
acknowledge federal judicial power to decide cases in this field, even when judicial rules of decision preempt state law.142 It is worth pointing out that there is no
Article I grant of power to Congress regarding admiralty and maritime matters—
a fact suggestive of judicial primacy in maritime matters, at least according to the
original constitutional plan.
Maritime law had a public law sub-branch and a private law sub-branch. The
public law branch was the law of war at sea, particularly the law of prize—
the rights of a belligerent to take title to captured ships and cargo.143 Even during
the Neutrality Crisis of the late eighteenth century, when the United States was
not actually at war, the in rem jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts was implicated
by French and British naval actions that resulted in ships sailing into ports along
the Eastern seaboard. Subsequently, prize cases arose out of the Quasi-War with
France, the War of 1812, engagements with the Spanish in the Caribbean, the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War.144 It
was undisputed that U.S. federal courts acting as prize courts applied the law of
nations in crafting rules of decision, and that their decisions preempted contrary
state judicial decisions or laws according to the Supremacy Clause.145
Private maritime law, also known as admiralty—law involving bills of lading,
salvage, collision, and crew and maritime worker treatment146—was a different
kettle of fish, by nature more similar to the law merchant. In fact, the law of maritime contracts and commerce was functionally identical to the law of terrestrial
contracts and general commercial law of the Swift v. Tyson type. And as application of general law on land grew in the wake of Swift, the federal courts also
expanded the scope of general maritime law over the decades, to the point that
the boundary concept of “navigable waters” came to encompass rivers and the
Great Lakes, and many claims with only tenuous connection to navigable waters
were brought within the federal courts’ admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.147
But private maritime law, unlike the law merchant, did not have an Erie denouement. Rather, the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen decreed that
general maritime law was federal law, preempting state law.148 That decision has
141. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 114–15.
143. Id. at 113.
144. See Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and
Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 88 (Christopher S. Schroeder & Curtis
Bradley eds., 2009); David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the
Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE 7 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Lee & Ramsey, supra note 144, at 89.
146. See generally GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).
147. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 124–28 (detailing the Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction).
148. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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drawn much criticism (including from Professor Clark, in a prior article),149 but
Bellia and Clark’s book does not take a normative position on whether Erie’s
logic should be extended to the private maritime context.150 They invoke the contrasting outcomes as an illustration of their point that there is no single formula
for the status of the law of nations as federal law.
In addition to the three categories of “Cases,” Article III, Section 2 extends the
federal judicial power to six categories of “Controversies.”151 One of these—
controversies “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects”—plainly implicates the law of nations and foreign relations.152 The subheading, commonly called the Alienage Clause, includes possible controversies between a U.S. state and a foreign state, between a state citizen
and a foreign state, and between a U.S. state and a foreign citizen or subject.153
The Original Jurisdiction Clause, with its reference to cases “in which a State
shall be Party,” plausibly applies to all three configurations, assuming that the
phrase “State shall be Party” includes a U.S. state or a foreign state.154 As I have
explained elsewhere, this part of the Original Jurisdiction Clause was designed to
give the Supreme Court the function of a “quasi-international tribunal,” adjudicating disputes both between American and foreign states and between one U.S.
State and another.155 Bellia and Clark do not discuss the Alienage Clause, but
because it implicates state-state relations, they would presumably agree that any
rule of decision handed down by the Supreme Court under its State-as-party original jurisdiction would preempt state law.
If, as I argued in Part II, the law of nations is implicated in interstate as well as
international controversies,156 then the list of relevant judicial power grants in
Article III expands by four: controversies (1) “between two or more states”;
(2) “between a State and Citizens of another State”; (3) “between Citizens of different States”; and (4) “between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States.”157 Of course, Erie blocked the use of any form of law
of nations in one set of controversies: those “between Citizens of different

149. See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)
(“In my view, Jensen is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York
would be in a case under the Due Process Clause.” (internal citation omitted)); Bradford R. Clark,
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1347–50 (1996); Ernest
A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 291–305 (1999).
150. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 131 (“For present purposes, whether or not Jensen and its
progeny have correctly interpreted Article III to incorporate general maritime law as federal law is not
essential to resolving larger questions relating to the law of nations and the Constitution.”).
151. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
155. See Lee, supra note 140.
156. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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States.”158 The Erie Court held that with respect to citizen-on-citizen diversity
cases, federal courts must use applicable state law to decide cases, not the general
law merchant.159 But it does not follow that the law of nations, whether general
law or federal law, cannot be applied to the other three Article III enumerations
of interstate controversies, or to the citizen-foreign citizen or subject controversies. The easiest case to make is for “Controversies between two or more
states.”160 This judicial power was intended to provide a method of adjudication
for border disputes or other disagreements between states. Such disputes are analogous to border or territorial disputes among nation-states, where the law of
state-state relations would apply.161 And the fact that states are adverse parties
logically compels the conclusion that state law cannot be used, because it would
favor one side or the other.162 Nor do Erie’s concerns about deferring to local
governance apply.
The question, then, is whether the remaining three categories of controversies
are more similar to citizen-citizen diversity and in Erie’s orbit, or more similar to
state-to-state controversies where the law of nations should apply, even if state
law says otherwise. Controversies between citizens of the same state claiming
land grants from different states seems to call for the application of a federal
choice-of-law principle to break the impasse. One would think that a citizenforeign citizen/subject controversy is similar to Erie. But there is surely greater
reason to refrain from applying state law when one of the litigants is a foreign
merchant. This must have been particularly true in the late 1780s, when the
United States was a weak military power and in dire need of commerce with the
European powers. Indeed, more generally speaking, it is not clear that Swift v.
Tyson was wrong as a matter of Article III’s original meaning given the felt need
in the late eighteenth century to foster interstate trade and commerce.
When one adds the four interstate enumerations of judicial power to the four
strictly international enumerations of judicial power in Article III, Section 2,
eight of the nine constitutional specifications of judicial power implicate the law
of nations as properly and fully understood. The only heading that does not is
“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.”163 Federal courts
scholars know very little for sure about this specific constitutional grant. It
appears to have been made for the purpose of affording the United States a federal
forum to sue individuals for civil liabilities to the government, such as breaches

158. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that state law, regardless of
whether in the form of a statute or a judicial decision, supplies the rule of decision in lawsuits brought in
federal court on the basis of citizen-citizen diversity).
159. See id.
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
161. See Lee, supra note 18, at 1067 (“In a fascinating case of historical feedback, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s water rights jurisprudence, refined over time in the crucible of sensitive interstate border
disputes, now constitutes a primary source of international law in transnational water rights cases.”).
162. See Lee, supra note 140, at 1782 & n.72.
163. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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of contracts with the U.S. government.164 Its principal application would have
been to citizens of the United States. However, it is plausible that suits by the U.
S. government against foreign merchants doing business in the United States
were also contemplated. If so, then all nine of Article III’s grants of judicial
power implicate the law of nations in some sense.
This remarkable truth of the language of Article III, Section 2 is obscured
today because the three heads of judicial power most commonly invoked are
cases arising under the Constitution or under the laws of the United States, or
citizen-citizen diversity controversies where state law provides the rule of decision after Erie. The prevalence of the constitutional and statutory parts of arisingunder jurisdiction today underscore a startling discontinuity. Neither flavor of
arising-under jurisdiction was provided for in the Judiciary Act of 1789—the
First Congress’s enactment that established the federal court system. Indeed, a
lasting general federal-question statute was not enacted until 1875.165 The only
part of the 1789 Act that arguably invokes arising-under jurisdiction is the socalled Alien Tort Statute in section 9 of the Act that mentions treaties and the law
of nations, not statutes or the Constitution.166 We turn, then, to the 1789 Judiciary
Act, which only selectively implemented the nine grants of judicial power enumerated in Article III.
B. REFERENCES TO THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789

The phrase “law of nations” is used two times in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Section 9, which details the jurisdiction of the newly created district courts, provides that the district courts “shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”167 This is the famous Alien Tort Statute (ATS).168 Section 13,
which sets forth the original and appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court,

164. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal district courts “cognizance,” concurrent with state courts
and federal circuit courts, “of all suits at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in
dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars.” Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. The circuit courts had jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts “of all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners.” Id. at § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78.
165. Act of March 3, 1875 § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (conferring on federal circuit courts—the principal trial
courts of the time—concurrent jurisdiction of “all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity . . .
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority” subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy threshold). The Federalist Party, after
losing both houses of Congress and the Presidency, had passed a general federal-question statute in
1801, but it was repealed the following year. Act of Feb. 13, 1801 § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of
March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
166. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
167. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
168. In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an alien could sue another
alien present in the United States under the ATS for violations of international human rights law that
occurred in a foreign country. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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provides that it “shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of
nations.”169 This reference to the law of nations in the 1789 Judiciary Act is
hardly ever mentioned, in contrast to the extensive commentary on the ATS.
Section 13 is plainly implementing the Article III, Section 2 grant of judicial
power over all cases “affecting Ambassadors, public Ministers, and Consuls.”170
The statute does not include suits against consuls, presumably because consuls
were quasi-diplomatic agents usually located in ports or commercial cities, not
the nation’s capital where ambassadors or ministers were received and confined
by the host sovereign.171 The statute does, however, include suits against “domestics or domestic servants” who are not mentioned in the constitutional grant.172
This was done presumably on the belief that any suits against domestic servants
of an ambassador fall within the constitutional grant of cases “affecting” ambassadors or other public ministers. It is puzzling why explicit reference was made to
the law of nations, because the Supreme Court would likely have consulted lawof-nations treatises to determine the scope of any pleaded ambassadorial or ministerial immunities in any event. The most plausible explanation is that the First
Congress sought to signal that the Supreme Court should be as protective as possible of the prerogatives of foreign ambassadors, going so far as to extend immunity to domestic servants, to avoid offense to their sponsoring states.
This statutory reference to the “law of nations” suggests an interesting counterfactual: What if Congress had passed a statute stripping ambassadorial immunity
in the Supreme Court where the law of nations would plainly grant it? I think it
beyond doubt that Bellia and Clark would assert that the Court would be bound
by that act of Congress, even though the Court could contravene any applicable
state laws.173 I would disagree. If the President and Senate ratified a treaty, then
that would bind the Court as the conventional law of nations. And perhaps the
President could do the same, because the Constitution directs that “he shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”174 Congress, however, has no explicit
constitutional authority over ambassadors under Article I, by contrast to the
Constitution’s references to ambassadors in Article II and Article III. Moreover, if
Congress could force the Supreme Court to hear original actions against foreign
ambassadors despite prohibition of such suits under general principles of public law,
then it would arguably infringe upon the Court’s constitutionally self-executing original jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and

169. § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
170. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
171. See VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. I, § 34, at 147–48 (describing the commercial roles of consuls
and contrasting them with ambassadors).
172. § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
173. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 234 (noting the consensus among scholars that U.S. courts
are bound by acts of Congress even if they conflict with customary international law).
174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Consuls.”175 And Marbury v. Madison famously held that Congress cannot infringe
upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional original jurisdiction.176
With respect to the much more famous law-of-nations reference in the ATS,
the Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that federal courts could
entertain suits brought by aliens against other aliens in foreign countries alleging
violations of customary norms of international law that were “specific, universal,
and obligatory.”177 The Court adopted this holding based on its conclusion that
the ATS was not intended to be “stillborn” when enacted, but was instead meant
to allow suits based on a small group of paradigmatic law-of-nations violations,
namely, piracy, ambassadorial infringements, and violation of something called
safe conducts.178 An implication of Sosa’s holding is that a case arising under customary international law is one that satisfies Article III “arising under” jurisdiction. That implication is at odds with Bellia and Clark’s claims about the limits
on the historical law of nations that count as federal law.
I have argued repeatedly that the reference to “the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States” in the ATS is not an invocation of substantive international
law.179
[T]he legal norms the First Congress had in mind when enacting the ATS were
not protean international law norms, but rather the domestic law of tort, understood as a noncontract injury to the person or property of the plaintiff. The
words ‘in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’ were
necessary to specify which aliens could sue, not to specify the body of law that
originated the claim. Put another way, the phrase was intended to narrow the
set of local tort law claims actionable under the statute. If, for instance, an
enemy alien suffered a personal injury or was deprived of property, the harm
would not usually constitute an actionable tort ‘in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty’ because international law generally permitted the wounding of enemy soldiers and the taking of enemy property. Accordingly, an
enemy alien could not bring a civil action in U.S. district court under the ATS.
But if a friendly or neutral alien, such as a Dutch or British merchant in 1789,
were to suffer such injury, he could sue under the ATS, even if the amount in
controversy was below the $500 threshold required under the 1789 Act for
general alienage diversity jurisdiction. Most alien tort claims then were likely
below that threshold.180
175. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (rejecting Congress’s power to enlarge the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction as contrary to the plain language of the Article III Original Jurisdiction Clause).
177. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
178. See id. at 714–15.
179. See Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1652 & n.34 (2014) [hereinafter
Lee, Three Lives]; Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 838 (2006).
180. Lee, Three Lives, supra note 179, at 1652 (footnotes omitted); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (authorizing circuit court jurisdiction “of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
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I believe, accordingly, that the ATS was enacted to provide damages in federal
court for aliens who suffered noncontract injury to person or property for which the
United States would bear sovereign responsibility under the law of nations or a ratified
treaty. If that is right, then the argument could be made that the ATS itself provides
the statute under which a suit arises similar to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
which is also a jurisdictional statute implicating sovereign responsibility.181
One other provision of the first Judiciary Act, mentioned in passing in the
Introduction, requires discussion. Section 34 is the famous Rules of Decision
Act, which provides “[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply.”182 The provision has been an enigma
for more than two centuries. Charles Warren argued that “laws of the several
states” included state judicial decisions based on their explicit inclusion in the
original Senate Bill version of the Judiciary Act.183 Wilfred Ritz, another prominent early American courts scholar, has asserted that “laws of the several states”
meant general law of all the American states, as opposed to English law, in part
because there was no widespread system of state court decision reporting in 1789
or in the then-foreseeable future.184 He also reasoned that the usages of the time
would have entailed the words “laws of the respective states” if it were intended
to refer to the laws of the individual states.185 And then there is the “in cases
where they apply” coda, which can be read as broadly or as narrowly as one may
prefer. Finally, the inclusion of “treaties” suggests that treaty provisions were
directly enforceable as rules of decision in civil actions in federal court, is in tension with the modern doctrine’s rejection of the presumption that treaties are
“self-executing” in U.S. courts absent an implementing statute.186
The upshot is that even if Section 34 provides reasonable support for the holding in Erie with respect to the constitutional grant of judicial power in citizencitizen controversies, it does not follow that it requires state law where it diverges
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five hundred dollars . . . and an
alien is a party”); § 12, 1 Stat. 79 (authorizing removal from state court to federal circuit court of the
same).
181. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 489 (1983).
182. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. The statute is virtually unchanged since 1789 and now
provides: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.” Id. (codified 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).
183. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 88 (1923).
184. See RITZ, supra note 107, at 46–52.
185. See id. at 81–87.
186. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–19 (2008) (construing Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter regarding compliance with International Court of Justice decisions as non-selfexecuting, therefore not binding as U.S. law or actionable in federal courts absent congressional
enactment of an implementing statute).
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from the law of nations with respect to cases or controversies in federal court pursuant to any other of the nine Article III grants.
In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story asserted that Section 34 authorized federal
judges to apply general law in an interstate commercial case, and that state statutes
and local usages and customs would apply with respect to intrastate matters—such
as local contracts, torts, and property-related disputes.187 In subsequent decades,
however, federal courts applied general law in increasingly more contexts, spurred
by the growth of railroads, which spawned related contract, tort, and property suits
with a plausible claim to general law under Swift by virtue of the railroads’ interstate span.188 Nearly a century later, the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins jettisoned the insatiably expanding general law regime under
Swift.189 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Louis Brandeis, relying on Warren’s
research, asserted that the federal courts had acted in contravention of the Rules of
Decision Act, to the point of acting unconstitutionally, by applying general commercial law in intrastate contexts where the states had police power.190 The Court
directed the lower courts to apply state law to citizen-citizen diversity cases going
forward.191 But Erie did not address or seek to limit the use of general law or any
other category of the law of nations pursuant to other Article III grants of power.
Indeed, as noted above, a similar regime to Swift survived the perturbations of
Erie in the law of the sea.
In sum, examination of Article III of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of
1789 suggests that the Americans at the Founding who adopted and implemented
the Constitution intended the new federal courts to play an active and energetic
role in the nation’s foreign policy. In fact, the constitutional commitment of ambassadorial and state-as-party cases to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
supports the conclusion that the Court, and not the political branches, was to play
the lead role in resolving suits between states and against foreign ambassadors.
Bellia and Clark’s identification of state-state relations as a key component of the
law of nations is a helpful start, but they do not examine in detail its interaction
with the enumeration of judicial powers in Article III. That leads them to underestimate the judiciary’s role in foreign relations under the original constitutional
plan.
Any doubt that the judiciary was originally to be as important a player in foreign relations as Congress and the President dissolves upon considering the initial
Chief Justice appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court. The first Chief Justice
nominated by President Washington and confirmed by the Senate was John Jay,
who had negotiated the 1783 Treaty of Peace, served as Minister of Foreign
Affairs under the Articles of Confederation, and took a leave of absence from the
Court to negotiate the follow-on peace treaty with Great Britain that bears his
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 16 (1842).
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304. U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938).
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80.
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name.192 The man Washington nominated as Jay’s successor, John Rutledge, did
not win senatorial advice and consent because he publicly attacked the 1794
treaty Jay had negotiated.193 Washington’s successor, President John Adams, sent
Rutledge’s replacement, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, to France to negotiate a
peace treaty to end the Quasi-War in 1799.194 Adams then replaced Ellsworth
with his Secretary of State, John Marshall. This pattern of appointments by the
Founding group shows that they intended the Supreme Court to be a central organ
for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.195
IV. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNTY
Part III demonstrated the extent to which a careful reading of Article III and
the Judiciary Act of 1789 is inconsistent with Bellia and Clark’s account of judicial passivity and deference to the political branches in foreign relations. What
animates their account is the sense that the original constitutional plan did not
envision that federal courts could entertain customary international law claims
from Americans or foreigners who alleged that a foreign sovereign had violated
their rights, or from Americans that the state or federal governments had violated
theirs without explicit congressional authorization. Why not? Because, Bellia and
Clark assert, the Constitution gives exclusive foreign relations powers to the political branches and so the courts must respect the traditional law of state-state
relations absent guidance from those branches.196 Of course, one could rejoin that
the law of state-state relations has evolved in the past two centuries to the point
where it now recognizes certain individual human rights claims against their own
states.
In this Part, however, I want to suggest that Bellia and Clark may be right about
their conclusion that an understanding of original history leads one to believe that
federal courts should not entertain such individual human rights claims. But I
would like to ground this conclusion not in the law of nations, but rather in the
concept of sovereignty as understood by Americans at the Founding. Sovereignty
played a very important role in the Founding—Americans fought a war of revolution for it. And I want to suggest that they had a particular vision of sovereignty
articulated eloquently by Vattel, whose law-of-nations treatise was so favored by
the Founding generation.
Vattel had a different normative project from Grotius. Grotius’s opus was the
pacifistic fever dream of a devout but tolerant theologian trapped in a time of forever war among Christian princes. He sought to show that beneath the surface of
192. See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 145–74, 197–222, 313–38 (2005).
193. See MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY AND ELLSWORTH, THE FIRST COURTS: JUSTICES, RULINGS,
AND LEGACY 44–45 (2008).
194. See WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 280–310 (1905).
195. See MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, THE SUPREME COURT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (forthcoming 2019)
(developing the modern-day implications of this historical truth).
196. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 75 (“U.S. courts must respect the rights of recognized
foreign nations under the law of state-state relations absent contrary direction from the political
branches.”).
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constant warfare and reciprocal distrust among Christian sects, there was a rich
connective tissue among all the Christian nations. He had enough experience and
knowledge of the world to know that he could not end warfare—the law of war
he systematized was extremely permissive of war by modern standards. But his
vision of an end to Christian internecine warfare and the dawn of a European
peace was realized in the Peace of Westphalia.
Vattel’s project was different and more focused on individual states, not a
world order. It was the promotion and protection of new democratic republics in
a world populated by powerful autocratic monarchies. Vattel was the citizen of a
Swiss city-state subject to the kings of Prussia, wedged amongst a cluster of
powerful monarchies with overlapping sovereignty claims.197 His primary mechanism for achieving the project was an innovative theory of sovereignty—
Vattelian sovereignty.198
Vattelian sovereignty had two key elements. The first was sovereign equality:
every sovereign state, no matter how small or how new, is the equal of any other.
Vattel brought the point home with a powerful metaphor: “A dwarf is as much a
man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most
powerful kingdom.”199 One need only consider the me´lange of kingdoms, principalities, empires, and cities that participated in the negotiation and ratification of the treaties that brought about the Peace of Westphalia to see how
innovative Vattel was in postulating sovereign equality. As a practical matter,
sovereign equality operated in favor of new and smaller republics carved out of
more powerful monarchies.
The second element of Vatellian sovereignty was a corollary to sovereign
equality: no sovereign state had the right to intervene in another sovereign’s internal affairs. Indeed, a norm of domestic non-intervention was necessary to make
sovereign equality meaningful.
A republican state in which a foreign sovereign decides the domestic scope of
individual peacetime rights and when to go to war would not protect the interests of its citizens. Without a norm of non-intervention, the republic might
become form without substance. At the same time, a facially neutral norm of
non-intervention would protect republics by reassuring monarchies fearing republican influence in their domestic realms.200

This normative vision of sovereignty, in my opinion, captured the sentiment of
the American Revolutionaries and was one reason why Vattel’s book was so

197. See VATTEL, supra note 18, at xii-xiii (describing Vattel’s life and career).
198. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (providing
an analysis of Vatelian sovereignty).
199. VATTEL, supra note 18, intro., § 18, at 75.
200. Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The
Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152 (2004).
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popular among the Founders.201 They had just fought a revolution against a
powerful mother country that still possessed the greatest navy in the world, vast
territories north of them, and forts and garrisons to the west. The American
armies and navy had disbanded with the peace, and there was no prospect of a
speedy recall or rearmament. Sovereign equality and a norm of non-intervention
were exactly what the United States needed as a militarily weak, revolutionary
republic. This vision of sovereignty, I believe, was hard-wired into the American
constitutional DNA and plainly influenced the early U.S. views on the law of
state-state relations that Bellia and Clark have ably documented. This genetic disposition compels a hostility to externally imposed substantive norms of conduct,
even if they are pitched as customary international law.
Vattel was extremely aggressive in his vision of the sovereign right to be left
alone:
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all
have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the
smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that
can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious.202

His view of the extent to which a sovereign can do what it pleases to its own
people was boundless: “If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them
with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business; and no other is called
upon to oblige him to amend his conduct.”203 Sovereign autonomy even extended
to what might be viewed as uncivilized conduct:
The Spaniards violated all rules, when they set themselves up as judges of the
Inca [ruler] Athualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect
to [the Spanish], they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused
him of having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives,
[etc].—things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up
the measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of
Spain.204

Many in the United States at the Founding engaged in a practice that was similarly viewed as uncivilized. Slavery, famously rejected in England by the estimable Lord Mansfield in 1772,205 was an essential part of the original U.S.
constitutional bargain, as evidenced by a regrettable provision in Article I of the

201. Additional possible reasons for the popularity of Vattel’s treatise among American readers were
its accessibility, relative compactness, and readability. It was also written in French, which was easier to
read than Grotius’ Latin, which was sprinkled with copious and sometimes obscure Latin and Greek
citations.
202. VATTEL, supra note 18, bk. II, § 54, at 289.
203. Id., bk. II, § 55, at 290.
204. Id.
205. See Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB).
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Constitution foreclosing the prohibition of the slave trade until 1808.206 It is for
this reason that it is hard for me to imagine that the original adopters of the U.S.
Constitution would have contemplated that the federal courts would be open to
hear claims based on violation of customary law-of-nations norms. But it was
about politics, not law as Bellia and Clark argue.207
CONCLUSION
Consider two questions. First, if every other country in the world abolished the
death penalty because it felt legally obligated to do so, must the United States outlaw the death penalty, absent its consent to a treaty banning it?208 Second, if a
ruthless dictator in a faraway foreign country uses extrajudicial killings to silence
domestic political opponents—a violation of customary international law—do
(and should) the non-U.S. citizen family members of victims have the right to sue
the dictator for money damages in a U.S. federal district court?
These two questions regarding the respect U.S. courts owe to customary international law have loomed large in U.S. foreign relations law scholarship since
Jimmy Carter was President. The United States stopped joining multilateral
human rights treaties under President Dwight Eisenhower, in large part because
of fears among members of the political branches that the treaties might be used
to advance the civil rights claims of black persons in the United States.209
Consequently, customary international law became the only potential path for
enforcing international human rights law against the United States and against
foreign violators in U.S. courts. If this customary international law is federal law,
then it is binding on the states. Many U.S. international law and foreign relations
law scholars, sympathetic to international human rights law, would answer both
questions in the affirmative, claiming support for their view in original meanings
and historical practice.210 Bellia and Clark’s book seeks to rebut these scholars’
claims as a matter of original meaning. Bellia and Clark assert that not all historical law of nations was federal law, and that the one branch that was—the law of

206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding
ten dollars for each person.”).
207. Of course, the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 made slavery unconstitutional.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
208. And if the United States did join a treaty banning the death penalty, despite the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment to permit the U.S. states to use it, would the
treaty’s prohibition take precedence? That was the question in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), which was subsequently dodged in Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
209. See generally DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016).
210. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561 (1984); Koh, supra note 32, at 1826–27.
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state-state relations—compels judicial restraint in enforcing rights that would
violate foreign and U.S. sovereignty.211
This Article has endeavored to show how the law of nations interacted with the
Constitution at the time of the Founding and the importance of the judiciary
branch in finding and using the law of nations to mediate the country’s international relations. The Americans who adopted the Constitution were keenly aware
of their place in the world as a militarily weak new state in need of peace and
trade with the European powers for survival, and thus eager to comply with the
law of nations—the intramural rules of the European world order. They recognized that newly created federal courts could play an important role in advancing
the new nation’s international acceptance and survival by judicious deployment
of the law of nations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, which is why eight
of the nine constitutional grants of judicial power in Article III implicated the
law of nations. The law of nations was the original federal common law. At the
same time, a strong respect for sovereign equality and autonomy borne of revolution inculcated a strong norm of non-intervention in the acts of foreign sovereigns
toward Americans or their own citizens.
What are we to take away from this Article’s foray into the history, which
diverges from Bellia and Clark’s prescriptions? For one, we can say that the original Constitution envisioned a far more robust role for the judicial branch in foreign affairs than broadly assumed today. But federal judges today lack the
foreign relations experience of their ancestors, and the federal courts as an institution have a diminished foreign affairs function. It does not seem reasonable to go
back to the past. We should acknowledge, however, that arguments for executive
deference, or for applying the political question doctrine or other doctrines to enable judicial abstention in cases implicating sensitive foreign relations issues, are
contrary to—not consistent with—original meanings, the plain language of
Article III of the Constitution, and early U.S. history.
A second finding is that looking to the law of nations to interpret the U.S.
Constitution was uncontroversial and was in fact part of the original design at the
Founding and in the nation’s early period. But it is not so easy to say that doing so is
necessary or even prudent today, given the long intervening history of Supreme
Court decisions and historical practice supplying homemade norms and rules to
which we can now turn. Again, just because it was done one way at the Founding
does not mean it is the best way to do it today. Indeed, nowhere does the knock
against originalism as a technique of constitutional interpretation seem as persuasive
as when it involves the law of nations, given the dramatic changes in the United
States’ standing in the world and how lawyers conceive of law and the law of
nations since the Founding. The irony, then, is that knowing the history better should
cause us to be more reluctant to deploy it without translation to modern contexts.
211. See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 270 (“[T]he Court has continued to require courts and
states to uphold the uncodified rights of recognized foreign sovereigns derived from the law of statestate relations (like head of state immunity), and to refrain from pursuing redress against foreign nations
for their transgressions in the absence of express authorization from the political branches to do so.”).

